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DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF EXPERIMENTALISM.
BY T. V. SMITH.
TO interpret as sheer experimentalism any form of the state
—
and particularly the democratic form, which during the last
century has, as Viscount Bryce notes,^ been establishing itself as the
universal norm—is of serious moment. The seriousness of such an
interpretation grows chiefly out of the unique ubiquity of the po-
litical state: uncertainty in the ultimate authority infects with un-
certainty all lesser associations. Man's fondness for absolutes indi-
cates his dislike for contingency. With Luther, men turned from
infallibility of Church to infallibihty of Bible and from infallibility
of Bible to guidance indeed more vague but hardly thought less in-
fallible, an immutable Law of Nature .^ Human nature seems such
that it cannot stay content at its job until it feels its back against the
wall of the universe. In order to tackle any problem with concentra-
tion and whole-hearted devotion, man needs some assurance that all
other (potential) problems will for the time being stay out. The
human terror at having too many things become problematic at once,
has made men slow to welcome democracy and reluctant even after
its coming to recognize it for what it is—a form of genuine experi-
mentalism.
And so the implied guarantee about things in general, derived
from the infallibility of king or pope or book or nature, has for long
seemed to men ample compensation for the infinite trouble about
things in particular caused by those who claimed the infallibility.
So thoroughly does the "turbulency of the crowd" terrify even the
crowd itself, in prospect or in retrospect, that for long men chose to
bear the ills they had (under autocracy) rather than fly to those
they knew not of (in an experimenting democracy). Hobbes' in-
sight is essentially sound in that men do prefer less with more se-
^ Modern Democracies, 1:3,
2 Ritchie, Natural Rights, pp. 13-14.
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(urity for enjoying it, to more conditioned by continual uncertainty
of tenure. Men will gladly exchange many "liberties" for a very
little order, if they think that order cannot be had in any other way.
J'his profound human desire for an absolute guarantee of the fu-
ture, for infallible guidance, has had a marked influence on men's
notions of how democracy is to justify itself. These notions may be
grouped under three general philosophies of democracy.
The first of these philosophies has to do with the individual-as-
such, his nature and his capacity ; iilie second with the group-as-such,
its nature and its capacity ; and the third, with a combination of the
(wo eventuating in a logic of scientific control.
I. A Philosophy of the Indiv-idual.
The individual-as-such—i. e., the individual guided neither by
(lod from above nor by rm immutable law of nature from beneath
—
has been universally adjudged impotent. "It is not in man that
walketh to direct his steps." On this conviction kings have ap-
l)ointed themselves keepers of men ; on this conviction men have
gladly suffered these self-appointed rulers. Had not inheritance
provided tyrants, fear of the future would have raised them up.
This inherited view of human nature, democracy has not entirely
overcome, but has sought to reconcile in the curious notion that
though a man as a man may be ignorant and fallible, as a voter he is
wiser and more dependable. This faith may be based, as Bryce
NUggests.-' on the tacit assumption that to bestow the ballot, bestows
also the will to use it, and that to establish a popular system of edu-
cation, guarantees that suffrage will be used wisely. Or it may be
based on the more naive view that when a mere man approaches the
ballot box (which has gathered a kind of halo from current discus-
sions of its purity, etc.), he somehow enters a sanctuary of au-
thority from which he, like the Pope, speaks ex cathedra.
Whatever be its basis, it can hardly be doubted that this con-
forting faith is abroad in democratic societies. This view of the in-
dividual might possess some validity if on the ballot he as a voter
were confronted with a sharp issue either alternative of which would
lead to better results than he unaided could produce. This would,
however, obviate the need of his voting at all. Moreover, no party
is willing to admit that the issue on which the common man votes is
not a live alternative, fraught with genuine significance to his coun-
try. No mystic faith can get more virtue out of a ballot box than
party leaders and voters have put into it. If it is not in man that
^ Moderyi Democracies, p. 70.
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walketh to direct his steps, then no electoral machinery can mys-
teriously endow him with power from on high.
II. A Philosophy of the Group.
But if reassurance cannot be found in the individual, let us seek
it in the group. A group, it is argued, is more than an aggregation
of individuals ; and out of this "more" comes super-direction. May
not the decision of twelve ignorani jurors be a wise verdict? The
admitted fallibility of the individual is supplanted by a new kind of
infallibility when many separate men become a group. The actual
increase of power and wisdom, so this view would hold, corresponds
in some mystic way with the feeling of heightened security which a
gregarious animal feels upon joining his group. Decisions that
would not inspire the isolated individual with confidence seem quite
the inevitable thing when one is a member of a great group. This
feeling of rightness and wisdom probably arises from the fact
that a crowd is mightier and is therefore better able to enforce its
desires than is the individual. But if we are to preserve any dis-
tinction between might and right, we can hardly take this as evi-
dence of the wisdom or rightness of the crowd. Moreover, the
crowd is more likely to be swayed by uncontrolled primitive emo-
tions (the very antithesis of wisdom) than is the individual, as mob
actions testify. This doctrine does not greatly gain in plausibility
even when stated in the impressive terms of a "real will" which,
whether men know^ it or can know it, coincides with the good of all,
though it may override the concrete wishes of every member of the
group.* While, then, we may grant that a democracy may conduce
materially to the feeling of security, it does not appear wherein it
really has any assurance other than what Hobson has called "the
hitherto baffling hope which has deluded several generations of dem-
ocrats, the power of numbers." ^ No more in the crowd-as-such,
then, than in the individual-as-such, do we find any superior excel-
lence of a democracy.
Indeed, it will be seen, I think, upon close analysis, that to the
extent that democracy has emphasized either of the foregoing mo-
tives, it is not really democracy at a\\. People who emphasize either
of these motives are in search of a new kind of Absolute. On the
one hand, they are looking for a magic that will make the voter as
* Hobhouse in The Metaphysical Theory of the State appears to me
to do full justice to this view, both in his refutation and in his
evaluation.
'^ J. A. Hobson, Democracy After the War. p. 159.
342 THE OPEN COURT.
voter infallible ; they seek a substitute for intelligence. Either di-
vine power or natural law must jjuarantee the outcome. Professor
Croly has remarked that "the faith of Americans in their country is
religious, if not in its intensity, at any rate in its almost absolute and
universal authority.'' '^ "The powers that be are ordained of God."
The voter of the popular faith is but the lineal descendant of the
king, and so the voter as sovereign can do no wrong either. Here,
then, instead of one, we have many kings, each being the same sort
of absolute sovereign as was the ancient king. It seems, on the
other hand, that this same sanction is not lacking in the philosophy
of those who find efiicacy in the democratic group-as-such. The old
adage expresses this truth literally, vox populi, vox dei, the first im-
plication of which is the guarantee of infallibility. The upshot of
both of these philosophies seems to be this: we do not want to go
wrong, and consequently we cannot do so.'^ But when we seek some
rational guarantee of the validity of this naive but elemental logic,
God or Nature seems the final sanction. Verily the soul of man will
not rest until it rests in certainty. If this be in fact democracy, it is
democracy made bearable by undemocratic blessings. It is democ-
racy builded on absolutistic foundations.
On the contrary, we are coming to admit for the first time that
democratic institutions must rest on democratic foundations ; and a
democratic regime must, if it be bearable at all, be rendered so by
democratic assurances. If such foundations and such assurances
cannot be found, then we must frankly resign ourselves either to
despair or to absolutism once more. Our political theory cannot
exist half slave and half free. This conviction brings us face to face
with a third philosophy of democracy.
III. A Philosophy of Scientific Control.
This is the philosophy of experimentalism. Negatively put,
this philosophy does not seek to read out of the individual-as-such or
out of the group-as-such an infallible guarantee of success. It rests
its case neither in divine guidance of king or of sovereign voter nor
in any law of nature that pushes us up—willy-nilly—toward an in-
evitable goal. It is equally distrustful of any optimism the basis of
which is laid in a hypothetical "real will" that may do violence to




James description of the bases of selfishness : "Whatever is
me is precious; this is me; therefore this is precious; Whatever is
mine must not fail; this is mine; therefore this must not fail."
Psychology, 1:318.
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the "will of all" as it journeys to the Absolute, the reconciler of all
contradictions. These are all would-be short-cuts to that Land of
Promise whereunto there is in truth no royal road. Indeed, these
remnants of absolutistic hopes are more than excrescences upon a
genuinely democratic order ; they are verily among the worst ene-
mies of democracy. As Croly has vigorously declared : "To con-
ceive the better American future ® as a consummation which will take
care of itself,—as the necessary result of our customary conditions,
institutions, and ideas,
—
persistence in such a conception is ad-
mirably designed to deprive American life of any promise at all." ^
Such views are forces of retardation because they encourage a soft
dependence upon mystic, if not magic, means; they encourage in-
stead of a belief in the efficacy of human effort, indolence born of
faith in. a "manifest destiny;"^*' they lead us to judge institutions,
not by their results, but by their pretentions—a procedure that has
been at the expense of mankind from the beginning; and, finally,
such views give us the feeling of security without the security itself
and at the same time cause us, in the enjoyment of the feeling, to
neglect the attainment of genuine security in the only way possible,
through intelligent and far-sighted control.
On the positive side, democracy as experimentalism makes it
clear that, in whatever other sense equality prevails, we are at least
all equally devoid of infallibility. Instead of an a priori deduction
of inevitable goods, we have only our own confessedly imperfect
instruments with which to brave the future. "Trial and error" is
here king of all. Genuine democracy represents man come of age.
He now must take himself for better or for worse. This is a game
at which we must throw our cards—our lives, our honor, or sacred
all—upon the table of contingency and look for no other sanction
8 Croly has elsewhere said that on the whole we "still believe that
somehow and sometime something better will happen to good Americans
than has happened to men in any other country". The Promise of
American Ldfe, p. 3.
9 ibid., p. 5. Cf . also J. A. Hobson, Democracy After the War,
p. 162. "One of the most subtle defences of conservatism has been the
modern notion, sedulously sown, that democracy was a process so in-
evitable and predestined in the evolution of society that no clearly
conscious and purposive direction was required. . . . Democracy
cannot be brought about by a drift or tendency of unconscious pur-
pose; it needs conscious organization and direction by the co-operative
will of individuals and nations,"
10 Croly says (ibid. p. 4 supra) : "The American calls his country,
not the Land of Promise, but the Land of Destiny, and quotes H. G.
Wells as saying: "When one talks to an American of his national pur-
pose, he seems a little at a loss; if we speak of his national destiny,
he responds with alacrity".
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than that provided by the experiment itself. Democracy, Uke all
things else, must submit to the test of time. "That such an experi-
mental philosophy of life," says Dewey, "means a dangerous experi-
ment goes without saying. It permits, sooner or later it may require,
every alleged sacrosant principle to submit to ordeal by fire—to trial
by service rendered." ^^ But the very danger of the challenge ban-
ishes fear and trembling and arms man with a new strength as he
goes forth to work out his political salvation.
But since this philosophy confesses its only instrument to be
experiment, trial and error, and since it proposes to apply this in-
strument to the state, upon which under our present system prac-
tically all our other institutions and cherished values vitally depend,
it must be prepared to show evidence—if there be any—that its hit-
or-miss experiments will not be more "miss" than "hit," that its
trial-and-error will not be all error.
Briefly put, the answer to this legitimate and highly important
question is found in the fact that man is a learning animal, that he
can profit by past experience. This human endowment expresses
itself in both passive and active adaptation to the environment (i. e.,
first in fitting man to his environment and then in fitting the en-
vironment to man.) This enables man constantly to change his mode
of reaction to the changing world There is nothing here of infalli-
bility ; so long as the future remains the future, it will remain con-
tingent. Time is time, and the road in front is entirely open.^^ And
herein is the element of risk, here is the genuine experimentalism.
But in man's ability to learn is the ground for hope that his trial
and error plan may be made to yield more successes than failures.
And here the group fortifies the individual ; here the individual en-
riches the group. For if we will avoid abstractions, we shall not
contrast the individual and the group ; but shall remember, as Pro-
fessor Tufts has said, that we have "a social individual," "a society
which reflects individuality." ^^ Through collaboration and com-
parison of experiments generalized conclusions can be had. Isola-
tion of conditions can be effected, and improvement be made con-
tinuous, though the generations come and go.^* In the social nature
of the individual and in his consequent ever-enlarging co-opera-
11 German Philosophy and Politics, pp. 125-6.
12 It is interesting to note that concurrent with the growth of
democracy, new philosophies emphasizing the reality and significance
of time—Bergsonism and Pragmatism particularly—have arisen.
^^Philosophical Review, 5:379.
1* As for technique, compare Will Durant's proposal for a Society
of Social Research, in Philosophy and the Social Problem.
DEMOCRACY AS A FORM OF EXPERIMENTALISM. 345
tion ^' lies the possibility of intelligent control, both of mankind and
of mankind's environment. It is in the concept of continuing and
ever-increasing control that there is to be found a substitute for
absolutism. Through a never-ending series of experiments so set as
to eliminate the errors of the preceding ones, we can gradually ap-
proach as a limit, happier adaptation to and completer mastery of,
our world.
Distrust of such a conception of democracy ought to be les-
sened by noting the fact that the suggestion really is that we apply
science to the problem of government. If democracy is ever to be
scientific, it must conciously and frankly become experimental.
Science knows no Absolute; its progress is indeed in inverse ratio
to the a priori element in it. It is an interesting fact that political
theory is the last great interest of life to falter at the threshold of
science. Why, even religion has entered the kingdom before politics
!
As was suggested at the beginning of this paper, the innumerable
interests ^^ that the state includes has made political theory the
citadel of conservatism. But as rapidly as it becomes indubitably
clear that the security that absolutistic theories promise is false, so
rapidly, it seems certain, will democracy, now spread throughout the
world, seek the only basis that can promise well for the long future.
Grief over loss of impossible infallibility or of specious certainty will
in time be replaced by a new found joy in creating manifold new
values in our human world. Experimental democracy means a
turning at last from magic to a growing control of such means as
can most surely realize whatever ends we set up as constituting the
goods of life.
1* The need of and the progress of co-operation is suggestively
sketched by Professor Tufts in his Ethics of Co-operation.
^6 For the state, to which alone the term democracy has as yet
been seriously appHed, even in democratic countries tends to swallow
up all other interests and organizations. To what extent thi« has
come true, Hobson vividly shows. Democracy After the War, p. 160.
